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A Deep Dive into the TP-Link RE190

·699 words·4 mins
Alaeddine Sahih
Author
Alaeddine Sahih
Exploiting binaries and breaking things.

Opening up the TP-Link RE190#

I bought a TP-Link RE190 WiFi extender to see if I could break into it, maybe find a backdoor, a vulnerability or something interesting.

At first, the device was a total ghost. I connected to it but nmap scans against the gateway IP (172.25.135.254) showed nothing but filtered ports and a Cisco MAC address

I had to get clever. I used ip neigh to inspect the ARP table, finally finding the device by its unique TP-Link MAC OUI (50:3d:d1...). By pinging the domain tplinkrepeater.net, I discovered it had pulled a dynamic IP (172.25.132.113) from the upstream DHCP server, correcting my initial assumption that it would be at the default address

Web Probing
#

I started by force-browsing for hidden diagnostic pages and found /web/modules/system/diagnostic.html. I tried to inject a payload into the NTP Time Server field to spawn a root shell: 0.pool.ntp.org; /usr/sbin/telnetd -p 23 -l /bin/sh

The web interface blocked me with an “Invalid Input” error. This was just client-side JavaScript validation and I bypassed it by opening the browser’s Developer Tools and manually deleting the pattern and maxlength attributes from the HTML input tag!

I hit “Apply,” but the router’s internal command parser—TPOS 2.0—refused to execute the shell command because it doesn’t understand Linux chaining like ;

Fw Dumping
#

Since the software was a shutdown door,I turned to the board.

Hardware:

  • Chipset: MediaTek MT7628 (MIPS architecture)
  • Flash: 4MB (EN25QH32B)

I used a CH341a programmer with an SOIC8 clip to dump the firmware out of the 4MB EN25QH32B flash chip. I identified the layout:

  • CONFIG partition: 0x003fc000 (8KB)
  • FIRMWARE partition: 0x0000d000

Digital Autopsy (Ghidra & Grep)
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The real work began with the raw dump.bin. binwalk revealed a chaotic mix of false positives and one massive 5MB file at offset 0xD080. I tried to carve out the filesystem at offset 1589059, but I was blocked by a proprietary, non-standard compression header.

I loaded the 5MB decompressed.bin into Ghidra as a raw MIPS32 Little Endian binary

The technical hurdles were brutal:

  1. Base Address: I mapped the kernel to 0x80000000 to resolve the jump tables
  2. MIPS Delay Slots: I hit “Flow Override” errors and had to manually force disassembly on the bytes in the delay slots to reveal the valid code packed behind them
  3. Credential Logic: found internal debugging strings like wlan_key and ipcam_auth_password. I traced the error message “invalid PSK password” back to a function that handled the authentication logic.

The key
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1. The Hardcoded Backdoor (CWE-321) I discovered a valid 1024-bit RSA Private Key hardcoded directly in the firmware. I extracted the block matching -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- and used OpenSSL to prove it was a mathematically valid key.

root@archlinux:~/tplink_dump# grep -A 5 "BEGIN RSA" decompressed.bin 
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIICXQIBAAKBgQDCklE2... [REDACTED] ...

-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

2. The Symmetric “Kill Shot” (DES Key) While the RSA key compromised the HTTPS layer, I needed the symmetric key used for data encryption. A deep dive into the decompressed web assets revealed a comment from a developer dating back to 2007.

Found in ./2478FE/decompressed.bin:

var iterations = key.length > 8 ? 3 : 1; //changed by Paul 16/6/2007 to use Triple DES for 9+ byte keys

Following this thread, I located the specific authentication key hardcoded in the binary:

authKey WaQ7xbhc9TefbwK

This 15-character key (WaQ7xbhc9TefbwK) triggers the 3DES logic, effectively acting as the master key for the device’s client-side encryption.

Potential exploits
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Vector A: The Passive Wiretap Because I extracted the symmetric authKey (WaQ7xbhc9TefbwK), an attacker does not need to guess the admin password.

Intercept: An attacker on the local network captures the HTTP login traffic (Wireshark).

Decrypt: Using the hardcoded 3DES key found in the firmware, they can decrypt the login payload offline.

Result: They recover the cleartext admin password without ever sending a packet to the router.

Vector B: Persistent Root I found strings related to ipssh.auth.none.allowed, proving the device has a hidden SSH server.

Download: An attacker downloads the config.bin backup.

Decrypt: Using the custom DES key, they decrypt the file.

Modify: They toggle the SSH flag to true and inject their own authorized keys.

Upload: They restore the modified backup file to gain a permanent root shell.